Introduction: underwriting process cyclic due to random surrounding
Long-term variations called "business cycles", are typically common for the most insurers and have several potential causes.
Understanding the driving forces of the underwriting cycles is a paramount theoretical and important practical problem.
Emphasize is put on cycles (cyclic behavour) attributed to the fluctuations due to random surroundings, to volatile interest rates, or to random up-and down-swings of the risk exposure in the portfolio. Deficiencies are introduced by the exterior ambiguities limited by the so-called scenarios of nature.
• Such fluctuations can not be foreseen and their dynamics is known deficiently since its origin used to be exogenous with respect to the insurance industry.
• It causes inevitable errors in the rate making, and irregularly cyclic underwriting process ensues.
• Adaptive control strategies fighting back cycles due to scenarios of nature are proposed in the multiperiod framework.
A simplistic model of insurance process and
a volatile scenario of nature
• the state variables w k ,
• the control variables u k ,
• the control rules γ k−1 ,
• the probability mechanisms of insurance π k .
• Assume that the annual probability mechanism of insurance π k is induced by the claim out-pay process V s (M ) = Ms + σ(M )W s , 0 s t, which yields the annual risk reserve process as • Development in time: introduce the sequence {W
. . , of independent Brownian motions and the sequence M k , k = 1, 2, . . . , of the random claim intensities. Assume that these sequences are independent of each other.
• The annual claim out-pay processes are V
• By volatile (homogeneous and with known generic risk) scenario of nature associated with the multi-period model and the annual mechanisms of insurance we mean the sequence of i.i.d. claim intensities M k , k = 1, 2, . . . , with known generic distribution G with support M = [µ min , ∞), 0 < µ min < ∞, i.e., only the lower bound µ min of the claim intensity, or the most favorable case for the insurer, is a priori known.
• The adaptive control (u(w), c(w)), where w is the past-year-end capital, satisfies the α-level integral solvency criterion if
• The adaptive control (u(w), c(w)), where w is the past-year-end capital, satisfies the
• The adaptive control (u(w), c(w)) satisfies the (α 1 , α 2 )-solvency criterion sharply if 
Synthesis of the annual adaptive controls
• For α i ∈ (0, 1/2), i = 1, 2, and for the
with respect to u is called α 2 -level initial capital corresponding to the claim intensity µ α 1 and to the premium intensity c.
• The solution c α 2 ,t (u, µ α 1 ) with respect to c is called α 2 -level premium intensity corresponding to the claim intensity µ α 1 and to the initial capital u.
The "fair" long-time average premium rate is EM since EV t (M ) = EM · t, so that the average annual claim amount is equal to the total annual premiums.
• We name equitable those controls (u(w), c(w)) which are holding the risk reserve large enough to secure solvency, but at the expectation i.e., around the "fair" capital value u α 2 ,t (EM, µ α 1 ). Otherwise, one would rightfully argue that this provision is used to cover the unexpected.
• The adaptive control (u(w), c(w)), where w is the past-year-end capital, is called ultimately equitable
• Equity requires premiums well-balanced with claims. Insureds ought to pay premiums which are sensibly concentrated around the long-run mean value of their losses. In that sense the customers will not be overcharged, but only in the long run (i.e., in the average throughout several insurance years), while in the separate insurance years the premiums may be above or below average.
For α i ∈ (0, 1/2), i = 1, 2, the adaptive control sensitive to w, iŝ A technical drawback of the control (û(w),ĉ(w)) is the necessity to calculate c α 2 ,t (w, µ α 1 ) for each w, i.e., to determine that non-linear function as a whole. Introducē
where EM is the ultimately equitable, or "fair" premium rate. Consider the control with linearized adaptive premium rates,
where c min = µ min , c max = µ α 1 .
• Construct a control with linear adaptive loading, but free of the drawback of uncontrollable solvency (i.e. improve (ū(w),c(w))).
• For the level β such that 0 < α 2 β < 1/2, introduce the strip zone with the lower bound u β,t = u α 2 ,t (EM, µ α 1 ) + z β,t , where z β,t < 0 is a solution of the equation
with respect to z, and with a certain upper bound u β,t such that
Eq.
(1) has a unique solution z β,t < 0 and the explicit expression for z β,t is obtained.
• There are different ways to select the upper bound u β,t . For example (recall that c min = µ min , c max = µ α 1 ), one may take u β,t = u α 2 ,t (c min , µ α 1 ), or 2 u β,t = u α 2 ,t (EM, µ α 1 ).
2 That selection is sensible because the premiums will not be larger than EM (i.e., µ β,t = EM in (2)), and no capital exceeding one least necessary to guarantee the non-ruin with probability α 2 is "frozen" as solvency reserve. For u β,t selected in that way, |z β,t | is the width of the strip zone. These reasons may be however unconvincing for a decision maker with other preferences.
Multi-period model of risk under volatile scenario
• General multiperiodic insurance process with annual accounting and annual control interventions w 0
• Write P π,γ {·} for the Markov chain with transition probability P . For brevity, we denote by P 
Conclusions

